On July 23, 2009, the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed a district court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of American Coach Lines of Miami, Inc. (ACLM). The court held that the plaintiffs, current and former bus drivers of ACLM, qualified for the motor carrier exemption to the federal Fair Labor Standard Act (FLSA) and were therefore not entitled to overtime compensation. Walters, et al. v. American Coach Lines of Miami, Inc., No. 08-15636, 2009 WL 2182419 (11th Cir. July 23, 2009). ACLM’s business operations included, among other things, shuttling cruise ship passengers via bus between the Miami and Fort Lauderdale airports and local hotels and cruise ship ports under contract with cruise lines.

In reaching its conclusion, the court first determined that ACLM was subject to the Secretary of Transportation’s jurisdiction under the Motor Carrier Act (MCA) because ACLM was licensed by the Department of Transportation (DOT), held all of the required authorizations from the Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration, and had been audited in the past by the DOT. Additionally, ACLM provided bus services that crossed state lines, derived approximately four percent (4%) of its revenue from interstate trips, and held itself out as an interstate motor carrier. Notably, the court rejected the plaintiffs’ de minimis argument – i.e. that ACLM did not fall under the Secretary of Transportation’s jurisdiction because it did not engage in a sufficient number of interstate trips – noting that analysis of the de minimis question requires consideration of both the number of interstate trips made and the percentage of revenue generated by those trips, and suggesting that the de minimis requirement may be altogether inapplicable in situations where a company holds the appropriate federal licensing and there is undisputed proof of some travel across state lines.

The court next determined that the plaintiffs’ activities – even though primarily intrastate in nature – constituted “interstate commerce” as that term is used in the MCA because they were part of the continuous stream of interstate travel. Specifically, ACLM’s airport-to-seaport routes “share a practical continuity of movement with the interstate or international travel of the cruise lines and their passengers ... [f]or cruise ship passengers arriving at the airport or seaport, ACLM’s shuttle rides would be part of the continuous stream of interstate travel that is their cruise vacation.” 2009 WL 2182419, at *6.

Finally, the court rejected the plaintiffs’ arguments for limiting the Secretary of Transportation’s jurisdiction over their work-related activities, concluding that: (1) neither the plain language of the MCA, nor the plain language of the FLSA, limit the Secretary of Transportation’s jurisdiction solely to transportation that actually crosses state lines; (2) the MCA’s “incidental-to-air” exemption, 49 U.S.C. § 13506(a)(8)(A), did not divest the Secretary of Transportation’s jurisdiction over ACLM with respect to regulation of maximum hours of work; and (3) to the extent a through-ticketing arrangement was required for ACLM’s airport-to-seaport routes to constitute interstate commerce, ACLM demonstrated that such an arrangement in fact existed.

This blog post was authored by Jeffrey Timmerman.